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ABSTRACT 
 
The safety problem which can arise when a plane encounters volcanic ash or desert sand 
clouds is discussed. The main aim of Ph.D. dissertation is to explain fundamental principles of 
a new automatic IT platform, which can monitor real time the presence of volcanic ash or 
desert sand clouds in the airspace around each airplane; so, this system will increase safety of 
flights, above all ensuring two very important advantages: 
 it will allow flight crews to fly avoiding encounters with volcanic ash or desert sand clouds, 
which represent a severe risk of disaster; 
 it will allow air-traffic controllers to avoid total closure of airspace, when this one is 
contaminated by those clouds; it causes, when it occurred, big losses of profits for airline 
companies and workers of this field. 
Initially, research was focused on possibility to describe, using inferential-statistical approach, 
passive scalar transport in turbulent flows characterized by not defined conditions; not reactive 
pollutant can be accounted as scalar in fluid flow, which they are contaminating, as volcanic 
ash or desert sand clouds can be considered a passive scalar in atmosphere. the attention of 
mass-media about the eruption of Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajokull, in 2010, drew attention 
on the social or financial consequences related to presence of volcanic ash in atmosphere,. 
Then, the aim of a lot of researchers changed because of two reasons, above all: analysis of 
precedent similar events or models developed to simulate that particular phenomenon post-
eruption; the interest of a lot of international scientists about aeronautical problem originated 
by presence of volcanic ash in atmosphere. So, research studies were focused on an automatic 
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system to monitor real time airspace and to alert air-traffic controllers soon enough to avoid 
that flying airplanes could encounter volcanic ash. Desert sand represents a known problem for 
air-traffic and the very significant difference with volcanic ash is the fusion temperature; this 
feature makes less dangerous than ash clouds for aircrafts. The system wants to monitor also 
these particles. 
This system, initially, was based on monitoring of air-routes; after about one year, the precise 
analysis of Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project played future guide lines up: 
airline companies and, so, pilots ask, often, air-traffic controllers to fly using Global 
Positioning System (GPS), just now, and SESAR wants to make this flying way the only one 
in the next future [1]. The global vision of all playing actors of the real situation is changed: 
each aircraft became an independent player and all other entities depended on these; this is the 
actual line research.  
When all parameters are defined and prototypal test results are favourable, it is clear that the 
automatic platform will represent a very innovative step in flight safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The safety problem which can arise when a plane encounters volcanic ash or desert sand 
clouds is discussed. The main aim of Ph.D. dissertation is to explain fundamental principles of 
a new automatic platform, which can monitor real time the presence of volcanic ash or desert 
sand clouds in the airspace around each airplane; so, this system will increase safety of flights, 
above all ensuring two very important advantages: 
 it will allow flight crews to fly avoiding encounters with volcanic ash or desert sand clouds, 
which represent a severe risk of disaster; 
 it will allow air-traffic controllers to avoid total closure of airspace, when this one is 
contaminated by those clouds; it causes, when it occurred, big losses of profits for airline 
companies and workers of this field. 
The developed methods are of theoretical and numerical kind. 
After the eruption of volcano Eyjafjallajokull, in 2010, International Civil Aviation Organization, 
in May 2010, decided to establish a task force; it would be complementary to the existing 
International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG) and was tasked to assist in 
the urgent development of a global safety risk management framework that would make it 
possible to determine the safe levels of operation in airspace contaminated by volcanic ash [1]. 
The problem is older than year 2010: it was born with first aircraft. It will be showed that the 
first accident was on 1944 at Naples. 
Main results obtained, especially, concern the following points: 
 the particular approach to the problem, which troubles a lot of people all over the world. 
It is very original: none automatic system able to monitor volcanic ash or desert sand in 
airspace is projected or realized in the world; 
 the process to know the right way to calculate the most important parameters of the first 
step of this project: two dimensions of scanning surfaces around each aircraft in flight. 
First results of statistical tests, generated by MATLAB software developed to define 
shape and size of the “casing”, are shown at the end. 
Research centers and aeronautical industries all over the world are trying to develop a 
procedure or a system able to avoid encounters without airspace closure; any scientist is 
studying an automatic system which can alert real time flight crews and air-traffic controllers, 
if an encounter seems possible; a lot of them tries to optimize forecasting algorithm to trace the 
most probable trajectory of cloud. Managing the problem of “big” particles in airspace, above 
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all of volcanic ash, is a new important challenge for civil aviation; if aviation authorities will 
neglect it yet, it can cause more significant damage to aircrafts and large economic loss, 
ignoring the risk of death of a lot of persons. The project discussed in following chapters could 
be an important step for future problem solution. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Volcanic Ash versus Aircrafts 
 
1.1 Most severe accidents since 1944 
 
“In the past 30 years, more than 90 jet-powered commercial airplanes have encountered clouds 
of volcanic ash and suffered damage as result” [2]. Global air traffic is significantly affected by 
the volcanic ash, especially when unfavorable weather conditions occur. About 500 volcanoes 
are still active all over the world and the plume thrown up by the eruptions provoked several 
crisis [3].  
The most famous accident about a jet-powered aircraft caused by volcanic ash regards the 
British Airways Flight 9, a Jumbo-jet Boeing 747, in flight on 24/06/1982, from London to 
Auckland; shortly after 13:40 UTC (20:40 Jakarta time) above the Indian Ocean, south 
of Java, the flight crew (consisting of 32-year-old Senior First Officer Roger Greaves and 40-
year-old Senior Engineer Officer Barry Townley-Freeman while 41-year-old Captain Eric 
Moody was in the lavatory) first noted an effect on the windscreen similar to St Elmo's 
fire. The phenomenon persisted after Moody returned from the lavatory. Despite the weather 
radar showing clear skies, the crew switched on engine anti-ice and the passenger seat belt 
signs as a precaution. 
As the flight progressed, smoke began to accumulate in the passenger cabin of the aircraft; it 
was first assumed to be cigarette smoke. However, it soon began to grow thicker and had an 
ominous odour of sulphur. Passengers who had a view out the aircraft windows noted that the 
engines were unusually bright, with light shining forward through the fan blades and 
producing astroboscopic effect.  
At approximately 13:42 UTC (20:42 Jakarta time), the number four Rolls-Royce RB211 engine 
began surging and soon flamed out. The flight crew immediately performed the engine 
shutdown drill, quickly cutting off fuel supply and arming the fire extinguishers. Less than a 
minute later, at 13:43 UTC (20:43 Jakarta time), engine two surged and flamed out. Within 
seconds, and almost simultaneously, engines one and three flamed out. 
Without engine thrust, a 747-200 has a glide ratio of approximately 15:1, meaning it can glide 
forward 15 kilometres for every kilometre it drops. The flight crew quickly determined that the 
aircraft was capable of gliding for 23 minutes and covering 91 nautical miles (169 km) from its 
flight level of 37,000 feet (11,000 m). At 13:44 UTC (20:44 Jakarta time), Greaves declared an 
emergency to the local air traffic control authority, stating that all four engines had failed. 
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However, Jakarta Area Control misunderstood the message, interpreting the call as meaning 
that only engine number four had shut down. It was only after a nearby Garuda 
Indonesia flight relayed the message to Air Traffic Control that it was correctly understood. 
Despite the crew "squawking" the emergency transponder setting of 7700, the 747 could not be 
located by Air Traffic Control on their radar screens. 
Owing to the high Indonesian mountains on the south coast of the island of Java, an altitude of 
at least 11,500 feet (3,500 m) was required to cross the coast safely. The crew decided that if 
the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude by the time they reached 12,000 feet (3,700 m) they 
would turn back out to sea and attempt to ditch into the Indian Ocean. The crew began engine 
restart drills, despite being well outside the recommended maximum engine in-flight start 
envelope altitude of 28,000 feet (8,500 m). The restart attempts failed. 
Despite the lack of time, Moody made an announcement to the passengers that has been 
described as "a masterpiece of understatement": 
Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have a small problem. All four 
engines have stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them going again. I trust you are not 
in too much distress.  
As pressure within the cabin fell, oxygen masks dropped from the ceiling – an automatic 
emergency measure to make up for the lack of air. On the flight deck, however, Greaves's mask 
was broken; the delivery tube had detached from the rest of the mask. Moody swiftly decided 
to descend at 1,800 m per minute to an altitude where there was enough pressure in the outside 
atmosphere to breathe almost normally. 
At 13,500 feet (4,100 m), the crew was approaching the altitude at which they would have to 
turn over the ocean and attempt a risky ditching. Although there were guidelines for the water 
landing procedure, no one had ever tried it in a Boeing 747, nor has anyone since. As they 
performed the engine restart procedure, engine number four finally started, and at 13:56 UTC 
(20:56 Jakarta time), Moody used its power to reduce the rate of descent. Shortly thereafter, 
engine three restarted, allowing him to climb slowly. Shortly, after that, engines one and two 
successfully restarted as well. The crew subsequently requested and expedited an increase in 
altitude to clear the high mountains of Indonesia.  
As the aircraft approached its target altitude, the St Elmo's fire effect on the windscreen 
returned. Moody throttled back; however, engine number two surged again and was shut 
down. The crew immediately descended and held 12,000 feet (3,700 m). 
As Flight 9 approached Jakarta, the crew found it difficult to see anything through the 
windscreen, and made the approach almost entirely on instruments, despite reports of good 
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visibility. The crew decided to fly the Instrument Landing System (ILS); however, the vertical 
guidance system was inoperative, so they were forced to fly with only the lateral guidance as 
the first officer monitored the airport's Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). He then called 
out how high they should be at each DME step along the final approach to the runway, 
creating a virtual glide slope for them to follow. It was, in Moody's words, "a bit like 
negotiating one's way up a badger's arse." Although the runway lights could be made out 
through a small strip of the windscreen, the landing lights on the aircraft seemed to be 
inoperable. After landing, the flight crew found it impossible to taxi, due to glare from apron 
floodlights which made the already sandblasted windscreen opaque. 
Post-flight investigation revealed that City of Edinburgh's problems had been caused by flying 
through a cloud of volcanic ash from the eruption of Mount Galunggung. Because the ash 
cloud was dry, it did not appear on the weather radar, which was designed to detect the 
moisture in clouds. The cloud sandblasted the windscreen and landing light covers and clogged 
the engines. As the ash entered the engines, it melted in the combustion chambers and adhered 
to the inside of the power-plant. As the engine cooled from inactivity, and as the aircraft 
descended out of the ash cloud, the molten ash solidified and enough broke off for air to again 
flow smoothly through the engine, allowing a successful restart. The engines had enough 
electrical power to restart because one generator and the onboard batteries were still operating; 
electrical power was required for ignition of the engines: all four engines were replaced [4]. 
Although the airspace around Mount Galunggung was closed temporarily after the accident, it 
was reopened days later. It was only after a Singapore Airlines 747 was forced to shut down 
three of its engines while flying through the same area nineteen days later (13 July) that 
Indonesian authorities closed the airspace permanently and rerouted airways to avoid the area; 
a watch was set up to monitor clouds of ash. Flight 9 was not the first encounter with this 
eruption – a Garuda DC-9 had encountered ash on 5 April 1982 [5].  
A nearly identical accident occurred, on the 15 December 1989: KLM Flight 867, also a 
Jumbo-jet Boeing 747, from Amsterdam to Tokyo, had the same bad surprise [4], flying 
without all 4 engines. After descending more than 14,000 feet, Captain Karl van der Elst and 
crew were able to restart the engines and safely land the plane. The pilot knew the story of BA9 
Flight so he asked his flight-engineer to try to turn on engines more and more under 4000m 
Flight Level and he could. In this case, the ash caused more than US$80 million in damage to 
the aircraft (requiring all four engines to be replaced), but no lives were lost and no one was 
injured. Luck helped also this flight!  
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Actually, the first case of damage of aircraft due to volcanic ash cloud is not very noticed or 
knew. During the Second World War, on 19 March 1944, Mount “Vesuvius” erupted at 
Naples; allied soldiers built an all-weather temporary airfield at Terzigno (NA), a few 
kilometers east of the base of Mount 
Vesuvius, and approximately 20 km 
east-southeast of Naples, Italy. The 
340th bomb group of B-25 Mitchell 
bombers was here and the planes 
overed with hot ash that burned the 
fabric control surfaces, glazed, 
melted, or cracked the Plexiglass, 
and even tipped some B-25s onto 
their tails from the weight of the ash 
and tephra. 
The eruption destroyed the base and nearly all of the 340th's planes were damaged, as shown 
in Figure 1.1, although a number could be repaired. The Vesuvian Observatory director, 
Giuseppe Imbò, was monitoring the volcano in that period and he alerted the allied captain 
before the eruption; this official didn’t consider dangerous the volcanic ash…and we know 
results, now [6] [7]. 
At present, the most known aeronautical problem caused by volcanic ash is the eruption of 
volcano Eyjafjallajokull, in Iceland, between 20 of March and 23 of April of 2010.  
Ash clouds from Iceland's spewing volcano halted air traffic across Europe, as authorities 
closed air spaces over Britain, Ireland and the Nordic countries. Tens of thousands of 
passengers were stranded in one of most disruptive events to hit air travel in years. 
Authorities said it was not even clear when it would be safe enough to fly again. In one 
sobering prediction, a scientist in Iceland said the ejection of volcanic ash — and therefore the 
disruptions in air travel — could continue for days or even weeks. 
Britain's Civil Aviation Authority said non-emergency flights would be banned in all airports 
until at least 6 p.m. (1700 GMT, 1 p.m. EDT). Irish authorities also closed their air space for at 
least eight hours, as did aviation authorities in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
The move shut down London's five major airports including Heathrow, a major trans-Atlantic 
hub that handles upwards of 1,200 flights and 180,000 passengers per day. Shutdowns and 
cancellations spread to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland 
and Switzerland. 
Figure 1.1 - Damaged war plane at Terzigno airfield (NA), after Mount 
“Vesuvius” eruption, on 19 March of 1944 
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In Paris, all flights north were canceled until midnight. At Copenhagen's international airport, 
where spokesman Henrik Peter Joergensen said some 25,000 passengers would be affected 
there. 
"At the present time it is impossible to say when we will resume flying," Joergensen said. 
Passengers found themselves looking up at departure boards where every flight was canceled. 
"I just wish I was on a beach in Mexico," said a passenger stranded in Glasgow. 
In response to concerns that volcanic ash ejected during the 2010 eruptions of 
Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland would damage aircraft engines, the controlled airspace of many 
European countries was closed to instrument flight rules traffic, resulting in the largest air-
traffic shut-down since World War II. The closures caused millions of passengers to 
be stranded not only in Europe, but across the world. With large parts of European airspace 
closed to air traffic, many more countries were affected as flights to and from Europe were 
cancelled. 
After an initial uninterrupted shutdown over much of northern Europe from 15 to 23 April, 
airspace was closed intermittently in different parts of Europe in the following weeks, as the 
path of the ash cloud was tracked. The ash cloud caused further disruptions to air travel 
operations in Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland on 4 and 5 May and in 
Spain, Portugal, northern Italy, Austria and southern Germany on 9 May. Irish and UK 
airspace closed again on 16 May and reopened on 17 May.  
Iceland's authorities had been warning the airlines for several years, asking them to determine 
the density of ash that is safe for their jet engines [8]. 
Most airspace started to close from 15 April. However, in the days following there were brief 
windows free of the cloud at different locations which were exploited to make a few aircraft 
movements. There then followed test flights and pressure grew to re-evaluate the criteria for 
safe levels of ash to fly through. 
On 16 April, a 30-minute break at Manchester allowed two flights to land, and one aircraft to 
be moved to Florida, empty (as there was no time for passengers to board). At Glasgow, an Air 
Transat flight to Toronto took off while a British Airways flight from New York, and 
a Thomas Cook flight from Orlando and Icelandair flights from Keflavik landed [9].   
On 17 April 2010, the president of German airline Air Berlin, in an interview with the 
newspaper Bild am Sonntag, stated that the risks for flights due to this volcanic haze were 
nonexistent, because the assessment was based only on a computer simulation produced by 
the VAAC. He went on to claim that the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt closed German airspace 
without checking the accuracy of these simulations. Spokesmen for Lufthansa and KLM stated 
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that during their test flights, required by the European Union, there were no problems with the 
aircraft [10].  On the morning of 17 April, Lufthansa moved 10 aircraft 
from Munich to Frankfurt at low altitude following visual flight rules. There were no problems 
reported and no sign of damage to the planes. The same day, an Airbus belonging to Ural 
Airlines attempted flying below the ash clouds from Moscow to Rimini. When the airplane 
was in Austrian airspace, the crew reported being low on fuel and diverted to Vienna, where 
the airplane landed safely [11]. 
On the morning of 18 April, KLM successfully carried out a test flight 
from Amsterdam to Düsseldorf with no problems. Afterwards, seven KLM planes with no 
passengers returned from Düsseldorf to Amsterdam. Air France also performed a test flight 
from Paris to Toulouse. In the evening of 18 April, German airspace was partially re-opened 
for a period of 3 hours allowing a plane of stranded holidaymakers from Faro, Portugal to land 
at Hanover [12].  
Some military aircraft which flew during the period of closure suffered engine damage, 
although no crashes were reported. 
On 15 April, five Finnish Air Force F-18 fighter jets on exercise flew into the ash cloud in 
northern Finland. Volcanic dust was found on the engines of three of the aircraft and a further 
inspection revealed extensive damage by molten glass deposits inside the combustion chamber 
of one of the engines. The engines were sent for disassembly and overhaul. As a result all 
unnecessary military flights were cancelled except for identification flights to enforce sovereign 
airspace. Meanwhile a BAE Hawk trainer with special equipment to sample the volcanic dust 
was being flown from the 41st squadron in Kauhava. [13] Even short test flights with an F-18 
revealed engine damage sufficient to destroy engines.  
On 19 April, NATO reported finding molten glass in the engines of at least one F-16, the result 
of flying through the ash cloud, leading to the scaling-down of U.S. military exercises. Royal 
Air Force flights to Selly Oak Hospital in Birmingham were grounded, and the United 
Kingdom Ministry of Defence considered flying British casualties of the Afghan 
War to coalition countries [14]. 
On 23 April it was announced that British Royal Air Force training flights had been suspended 
following volcanic ash damage to the engines of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft [15]. 
People, who work in aeronautical branch above all to ensure flights safety, realized that 
volcanic ash was a very dangerous question, on 1991, when Mount Pinatubo, located on 
Luzon island in Philippines, erupted. The first large ash-producing eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo took place at 0851 local time (0051 G.m.t.) on June 12, 1991. Analysis of satellite 
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images indicates that the ash cloud from the June 12 eruption was carried by upper level winds 
at speeds of approximately 15 to 20 m/s along a heading of 215° from the volcano, into the 
airspace west of Manila. At least three aircraft flew into this ash cloud. The first aircraft 
encounter was on June 12, 1991, at 1220 local (0420 G.m.t.) at a site approximately 170 km 
southwest of the volcano. The second encounter took place at 1630 local (0830 G.m.t.) and 
occurred at a site approximately 1,000 km west of the volcano. The position of the third 
encounter is unknown. While these encounters were reported in the national and international 
news media, the gravity of the volcanic threat to aviation safety was not fully appreciated, until 
the days after the June 15 eruption. The patterns of ash dispersion of these clouds were 
complicated by the passage of Typhoon YunyaThe heavy tropical rainfall associated with the 
typhoon saturated the ash as it fell, and loading of airport hangars and facilities with water-
saturated ash caused extensive damage to facilities at Cubi Point, Clark, and Basa airports. At 
least 13 aircraft flew into the ash cloud from the June 15 eruption. Movement of the June ash 
cloud was detected by the Japanese geostationary meteorological satellite (GMS); by the total 
ozone mapping spectrometer (TOMS) aboard the Nimbus-7 polar-orbiting satellite; and by the 
advanced very high resolution radiometer (AVHRR) aboard the NOAA-10 and -11 polar-
orbiting satellite. Observations of the eruptions from these satellites were important for 
detecting and tracking the ash clouds. Ash from the June 15-16, 1991, eruption caused the 
closing of civilian airports at Manila, Puerto Princesa, and Legaspi and military airfields at 
Clark Air Base, Basa Air Base, Sangley Point Air Base, and Cubi Point Naval Air Station. At 
Manila's Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and Sangley Point Air Base, between 
0.5 and 1 cm of fine sand to powder-size ash fell in a mostly dry condition on June 15-16, 
1991. This ash caused these airports to close for 4 days until ash could be removed from 
runways, taxiways, and apron surfaces. Normal operations at NAIA resumed on July 4, 1991. 
Volcanic ash on airport surfaces caused reduced visibility and affected aircraft maneuvering, 
especially when the ash was wet. Ash on airport surfaces was ingested into engines during 
taxiing, takeoffs, and landings and also contaminated landing gear assemblies and brakes. Ash 
fall from a minor eruption on July 17, 1991, deposited less than 1 mm of ash over the Manila 
area, and NAIA was closed for ash removal from 1700 on July 17 through 1900 on July 18. 
While landing on July 19, one jumbo jet skidded off the runway because of reduced braking 
action on wet ash. The large number of encounters with the Pinatubo ash cloud, including 
several encounters that involved airplanes from the same company, reflects a major breakdown 
in the way that information about the ash cloud hazard was communicated and the ways that 
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users responded to the information. This breakdown occurred at several levels, including 
between adjacent FIRs as well as within individual airline companies [16]. 
Another dangerous volcano is 
Mount Popocatepetl, in 
Mexico. It erupted also on 24 
February 2015 and the 
eruption also produced an ash 
column 4 km high, as well as 
throwing hot rocks and debris 
up to 700 m from the crater. 
Ash drifted to the south and 
east following the eruption, 
leading to ashfalls in a 
number of nearby towns. This 
is the second time flights 
from Puebla International have been disrupted by Popocatépetl this year, as shown in Figure 
1.2, the first having occurred following an eruption on 15 January. Popocatépetl is one of 
Mexico's most active volcanoes, having been erupting more-or-less continuously since 1994 
[17]. This volcano affected several flights in 1997 and 1998. Although damage was minor in 
most cases, one flight crew experienced significantly reduced visibility for landing and had to 
look through the flight deck side windows to taxi after landing. In addition, the airport in 
Mexico City was closed for up to 24 hr on several occasions during subsequent intermittent 
eruptions [2].  
One of the most active volcanoes in the world is Mt. Etna, in Italy, characterized by explosive 
activity ranging from mild strombolian to sub-plinian. Activity occurs from the central craters 
and/or from fractures opened along the volcano flanks. In the last two decades the number of 
explosive events has increased and, because the volcanic plumes remained in the atmosphere 
from several hours to days, they forced several times the closure of the International Airport in 
Catania, only 30 km far from the volcanic vent. The most reported damages to aviation in Italy 
are, infact, due to Etna’s eruptions. Major inconvenience occurred also on 24 September 1986, 
when NEC formed an eruption column of 10–13 km a.s.l., and on 22 July 1998, when the 
eruption column reached 12 km a.s.l. Between 26 January and 24 June 2000, SEC produced 64 
lava fountains forming weak plumes up to 6 km a.s.l. In particular, on 26 April 2000 an Airbus 
320 taking off from Catania to Milan encountered volcanic ash and was forced to flight back to 
 Figure 1.2 - Eruption of Mount Popocatepetl, on 24 February 2015 
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Catania. The next year, an eruptive fracture opened at 2570 m a.s.l. producing a weak plume 
rising up to 5–6 km a.s.l. between 21 and 24 July that caused the cancellation of flight 
operations of Catania and Reggio Calabria airports. Tephra fallout was also a significant 
phenomenon during the 2002–2003 Etna eruption. Weak plumes having heights between 2.5 
and 7 km a.s.l. were almost continuously present between 27 October and the end of the 
explosive activity in December 2002. The International Airport of Catania was often forced to 
close to avoid accidents, causing considerable economic losses and inconveniences to the 
south-eastern population of Sicily. The airport was forced to close again on 24 November 2006 
because ash fallout covered the SE flanks of the volcano [18]. 
On February 2014, volcano Kelud brought to the closure of three international airports in 
Indonesia.  
Volcanic ash clouds flow in airspace around world, not only on the volcanoes during 
eruptions; the closure of a little part of airspace is not very safe.  
Pilots are also very troubled, now [19] ! 
 
1.2  Volcanic ash features 
 
Volcanic ash clouds are made up of small abrasive particles that can clog up jet engines and 
stop them working. Planes 
are either re-routed or 
grounded when there is a 
danger of flying into ash 
clouds to ensure the safety 
of passengers and avoid 
very costly damages [20]. 
Three possible modes of 
behavior of eruption 
columns - intensity of 
eruption increases from left to right.  Wind is from the left in each case.  In Figure 1.3, at side 
of each diagram are shown normalized velocity (v) profiles versus height (h) for these columns.  
Left, weak isolated thermals, which are influenced by the wind.  Center, a higher intensity 
buoyant column, influenced by wind only at the top.  Right, a high intensity, superbuoyant 
column with a pronounced umbrella region [21]. 
Figure 1.3 - Velocity (v) profiles versus height (h) 
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Wind and eruption style are the two major controls on the 
dispersal of ash from an erupting volcano. Eruption style affects 
(1) volume and size of ash produced by varying rates of magma 
supply; and (2) the range of altitude(s) to which ash is propelled 
or rises. 
Wind direction and speed above and downwind from an erupting 
volcano affects the dispersal pattern of volcanic ash in the 
atmosphere and ash fall on the ground. Both direction and speed 
typically varies with increasing altitude above the ground and 
distance from an erupting volcano. Significant change in wind direction and speed may occur 
during the course of a single long eruption (12-36 
hours), which can result in a complex and 
changing ash-dispersal pattern, especially during 
cyclones or hurricanes, as on 1997 Mount 
Pinatubo. During the course of a prolonged series 
of eruptions that last weeks to months, changing 
wind patterns will typically blow ash in widely 
different directions. 
The average grain-size of rock fragments and 
volcanic ash erupted from an exploding 
volcanic vent varies greatly among 
different eruptions and during a single 
explosive eruption that lasts hours to days. 
Heavier, large-sized rock fragments 
typically fall back to the ground on or 
close to the volcano and progressively 
smaller and lighter fragments are blown 
farther from the volcano by wind, as 
shown in Figure 1.5. Volcanic ash, the 
smallest particles (2 mm in diameter or 
smaller), can travel hundreds to thousands 
of kilometers downwind from a volcano 
depending on wind speed, volume of ash 
erupted, and height of the eruption 
Figure 1.4 – Ash Source 
Figure 1.5 – Volume of volcanic ash cloud VS. distance 
from the vent  
Figure 1.6 - Distribution of hazards to aircraft around explosive 
eruption columns of three selected frequencies 
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column [22] [23].Volcanic ash is the material produced by explosive volcanic eruptions that is 
<2mm in diameter. Fine ash is <0.063mm; coarse ash is between 0.063mm-2mm. Volcanic 
ash is made up of various proportions of vitric (glassy, non crystalline), crystalline and lithic 
(non magmatic) particles. The density of individual particles may vary between 700-
1200kg/m3 for pumice, 2350-3200 kg/m3 for glass shards, 2700-3300kg/m3 for crystals and 
2600-3200 kg/m3 for lithic particles. Since coarser and denser particles are deposited close to 
source, fine glass and pumice shards are relatively enriched in ash fall deposits at distal 
locations [24]; vitric typically contain small voids formed by expansion of magmatic gas before 
the enclosing magma solidified, known as vesicles. Ash particles can have varying degrees of 
vesicularity. Vesicular particles can have extremely high surface area to volume ratios. 
Exsolved magmatic gases condense onto ash particle surfaces, while they are in the conduit 
and ash plume. It has long been recognized that a range of sulphate and compounds are readily 
mobilized from fresh volcanic ash. These salts are formed as a consequence of rapid acid 
dissolution of ash particles within eruption plumes, which is thought to supply the cations 
involved in the deposition of sulphate and halide salts. The selective leaching of metals from 
silicate lattices is coupled to proton consumption, consistent with metal-proton exchange 
reaction. The eruption of Eyjafjallajokull was made up two distinct phases: an early 
hydromagmatic, explosive phase that generated very fine ash (with 20% mass<10µm and a 
surface area of 4.3m2/g) and a later phase (<10 µm less than 2% mass, and a surface area of 
0.45m2/g) [25]. 
The pH of fresh ash leachates is highly variable. Freshly-fallen volcanic ash clearly has the 
potential to be corrosive. Its surface coating contains salts and sometimes also acidic gas 
condensates. These salts are very readily soluble and may deliquesce, if relative humidity is 
high. Light wet weather conditions will also provide sufficient moisture to mobilise ionic 
components into a surface flim, whereas heavy rain will wash ash away or remove soluble 
components. [26] [27].  
These salts can be hygroscopic and increase the ability of ash to take up water vapor, which is 
the dominant gas emitted during most explosive volcanic eruptions. Water vapor 
concentrations can increase further from the upward transport of evaporated groundwater or 
glacial ice and from the entrainment of moist environmental air. If water vapor concentration 
is high enough to form liquid coatings on ash, important implications arise for the aggregation, 
atmospheric lifetime, and detection ability of the ash. Furthermore, activation of ash into cloud 
droplets or formation of ice crystals can notably increase plume temperature and buoyancy 
through latent heat release, as well as indirectly affect climate by contributing cloud 
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condensation nuclei (CCN) and ice nuclei (IN). The occurrence of wetted ash aggregates and 
frozen hydrometeor fallout is observational proof of ash-water interactions, yet limited data 
exists to quantify the ability of ash to take up water vapor. All samples exhibited high specific 
surface areas, were more reactive towards H2O than N2, and formed a monolayer of H2O at 
0.05 - 20 % relative humidity. This led to the assumption in many microphysical studies that 
ash is always covered by a liquid layer. However, the high temperature and strong competition 
for water vapor among the high concentration of ash particles in the plume may deplete the 
supersaturation, so that few (if any) particles can have complete coverage of water, especially 
in the near vent region [28]. 
 
 
1.3  Desert sand features 
 
There were mentioned only crisis due to volcanic ash; actually, desert sand represents a well -
known problem for aviation. It has been just studied for a lot of years: some issues and 
accidents to war planes happened during the Second World War; after this conflict, some 
researchers try to know causes and the desert sand was often indicated as origin [29]. The 
desert sand clouds or dust plumes represents a very dangerous problem yet; it is a natural event 
and it cannot stopped; thus it is also currently studied. The impact of transpacific transport of 
mineral dust on aerosol concentrations in North America during 2001 was estimated using a 
global chemical transport model (GEOS-Chem). The model captures the magnitude and 
seasonal cycle of observed surface dust concentrations over the northern Pacific. It simulates 
the free tropospheric outflow of dust from Asia observed in the TRACE-P and ACE-Asia 
aircraft campaigns of spring 2001. It reproduces the timing and distribution of Asian dust 
outbreaks in North America during April–May. Beyond these outbreaks, persistent Asian fine 
dust (averaging 1.2 µg m−3) was in surface air over the western United States in spring, with 
much weaker influence (0.25 µg m−3) in summer and fall. Asian influence over the eastern 
United States is 30–50% lower. Transpacific sources accounted for 41% of the worst dust days 
in the western United States in 2001 [30]. Dust plume is also affected by freezing, as volcanic 
ash. the freezing of water by three different types of mineral particles at temperatures between 
−12°C and −33°C, representing Asia Dust, Sahara Dust and Arizona test Dust, which had 
particle concentrations of sizes that were log-normally distributed with mode diameters 
between 0.3 and 0.5 µm and standard deviations, σg, of 1.6–1.9. The results from the freezing 
experiments are consistent with the singular hypothesis of ice nucleation. The dusts showed 
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different nucleation abilities: Arizona test Dust showing a rather sharp increase in ice-active 
surface site density at temperatures less than −24°C. Asia Dust was the next most efficient 
freezing nuclei and showed a more gradual increase in activity than the ATD sample [31]. 
Obviously, it is important to know the chemical composition of desert sand or dust plume: 
during the ANT VII/1 cruise of the research icebreaker RV Polarstern from Bremerhaven 
(Germany) to Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil), atmospheric particulate matter was collected by bulk 
filtration with a time step of 36 hours. Elemental analyses were performed in order to 
determine atmospheric aerosol concentrations of Al, Si, P, S, K, Ca, Ti, Mn, Fe, and Zn over 
the North Sea, the Channel, and the North and South Atlantic. The slight and continuous 
moving in latitude, associated with the large variability in concentration levels and chemical 
composition, allow researchers to point out the relative influence of the major sources of 
particulate matter: desert soil-dust in the tropical North Atlantic, anthropogenic emissions in 
the North Sea and the Channel, and biomass burning and continental biogenic activity in the 
tropical South Atlantic [32]. Dust loadings containing up to 54 µg/m3 Al (submicron plus 
supermicron fraction) were measured during particularly intense dust events. Mixing of dust 
with anthropogenic aerosols, mainly NH4HSO4, was observed in the fine fraction. It was 
associated with air masses that had originated over Europe and then traveled over North 
Africa. The ratio of nitrate to non-sea-salt sulfate was around 0.3. This argues against any 
significant influence of biomass burning emissions, which have much higher nitrate. However, 
we also encountered aged fossil fuel pollution plumes, likely from North America. The 
geochemical signature of mineral dust was consistent with previous results in the area. Si, Fe, 
and Ti were not enriched with respect to the soil composition, while other elements, such as 
Ca and S, were. Ca is prevalently present as calcite in African soils, but it is also found as 
calcium sulfate in the atmosphere [33] . Mineral dust and volcanic ash aerosol both show an 
enhanced coarse mode (>1 µm) aerosol concentration, but volcanic ash aerosol additionally 
contains a significant number of Aitken mode particles (<150 nm) not present in mineral dust 
[34]. The very important difference between volcanic ash and desert sand is the relative melting 
temperature, Tf: the second kind of particles have a higher Tf than first kind, so volcanic ash 
can damage engines easily; high temperature of the engines melts volcanic ash particles sooner 
and they can block the air compressor. The fusion point of pure silica is 1,760 C (3,200 F). 
However, desert sand, composed above all of Calcium Carbonate (CaCO3 ,Calcite and 
aragonite), Dolimite (Mg,CaCO3 ), Halite (NaCl), Iron Oxide (Fe2O3 ), Gypsum and 
Feldspar, has a lower melting point due to impurities: this temperature is however greater than 
1230°C, even if is very dependent on mix [35].   
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1.4  Structural damages to aircrafts  
 
Volcanic ash are highly abrasive particles that may damage aircraft components, particularly 
forward facing surface of external parts and engine components. They are made of sharp rock 
fragments that will easily erode plastic, metal and even glass pieces. In service events show that 
aircraft may suffer from extensive damage after volcanic ash encounter. In some cases, all the 
following parts were removed and replaced, after they were sand blasted:  
 windshields  
 forward cabin windows  
 navigation and landing lights cover  
 wing, stabilizer and fin leading edges  
 engine nose cowls and thrust reversers  
 all pitot and static probes. 
In the Figure 1.7 (made by NASA), it is possible to read most important damages occurred to 
some aircrafts during very famous encounters [36]: 
In addition to the aircraft damage that was immediately evident in the days following the 
encounter, damage related primarily to SO2 gas has been reported by some airline companies 
and manufacturers. In June 1992, one year after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, there was an 
accident involving loss of engine power on a jumbo jet owing to accumulation of sulfate 
deposits in jet engines. Isotopic studies of these deposits suggest that the sulfate is derived from 
the ingestion and oxidation of SO2 and sulfuric acid aerosols that originated in the Pinatubo 
eruption cloud of June 15. Related problems recognized in 1992 such as the increased 
incidence of crazing of acrylic windows and fading of polyurethane paint on jetliners are also 
Figure 1.7 – Frequent damage caused to aircrafts 
16 
 
due to volcanogenic sulfuric acid droplets in the atmosphere. Frequent inspections of aircraft 
should reveal any corrosion problems due to volcanogenic sulfur gases [21]. 
In large eruptions, ash can be ejected from the volcano to heights at which commercial aircraft 
normally cruise. When these high-altitude ejections occur, volcanic ash can cause considerable 
harm to aircraft in a large number of ways:  
 Erosive Effects: Ash can “blind” pilots by sandblasting the windscreen, taking away the 
visual cues required for a safe landing. The ash can cause erosive damage to the fuselage, 
and can form a coating on the plane that affects aerodynamics. In addition, sandblasting 
can damage the landing lights, causing their beams to diffuse and be ineffective in the 
forward direction.  
 Blocking or Clogging of Pitot Tubes: Pitot Tubes are hollow, forward-facing tubes 
mounted on an aircraft to support flight instruments. Air speed is measured by comparing 
the pressure in the forward-facing tube to the ambient pressure. Volcanic ash can 
accumulate in pitot tubes and prevent accurate functioning of the cockpit air speed 
indicators. Failure of these systems can have catastrophic consequences. For example, in 
the Birgenair Flight 301 accident, an insect created a nest in a pitot tube; the resulting 
incorrect air speed indications ultimately led to the death of 189 passengers and crew.  
 Electromagnetic Interference: Volcanic ash particles are charged. As such, they can affect 
communication by radio and disturb other electrical instruments onboard an aircraft.  
 Engine Failure: Volcanic ash can severely damage jet aircraft engines. During flight, large 
volumes of air are sucked into aircraft engines. Very fine volcanic ash particles melt at 
about 1,100 °C. As ash particles are sucked into a jet engine, they fuse onto the blades and 
other parts of the turbine (which operates at about 1,400 
°C). Substantial quantities of ash can erode and destroy 
engine parts or cause jams in the rotating machinery. In 
addition, ash may clog and fuse to engine sensors, leading 
to erroneous readings, 
which may result in 
improper control and 
unplanned engine 
shutdowns. While 
aircraft-based and 
ground-based cloud 
measuring instruments Figure 1.8 - Volcanic ash vs. fan blades Figure 1.9 - Silicate buildup on engine parts 
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can detect potentially hazardous water-cloud formations, most do not have the ability to 
differentiate weather clouds from ash clouds [37]. 
NASA already performed an ash cloud test on an airliner a full decade ago, albeit 
unintentionally. In February of 2000, a NASA DC-8 bound for Sweden flew right through an 
ash plume produced by Icelandic volcano Mt. Hekla. The flight crew couldn't see the plume, 
and in a stroke of good fortune they landed their plane at their destination without accident. 
In fact, no visible damage was detected upon arrival, but a closer inspection turned up some 
harrowing clues to just how devastating volcanic ash can be on an airplane in flight. 
Interestingly – and quite fortunately for the crew on board – the relatively low dose of hot ash 
the DC-8 received temporarily turbocharged the engine by polishing the engine parts and 
letting air move more freely through the components, as it is possible to see in Figure 1.8 and 
Figure 1.9. But make no mistake; too much more of that kind of performance enhancing 
would have led to engine failure, and at 30,000 feet all engine failure is a serious issue. 
These tests and other 
tests or evidences 
allowed Rolls-Royce, 
a very important jet 
engines 
manufacturer,  
to realize the graph 
in Figure 2.10: 
volcanic ash seems a 
similar problem to 
fatigue, damages 
increase as much as the time of 
work in dangerous condition. British Airways Flight 9 and KLM flight 867 flew a lot of time in 
very severe conditions, so aircrafts suffered consequences described previously [38]. 
  
Figure 1.10 - Duration of Exposure vs. Ash Concentration 
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CHAPTER 2 – Issues related to the argument 
 
2.1  Financial losses during crisis 
 
During the eruption of Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajokull, people understood that a crisis due 
to volcanic ash clouds can produce very large financial losses, above all for airline companies. 
No airline wants to fly its planes through ash clouds since it is a safety hazard and can damage 
and destroy aircraft engines, but it appears that during the recent volcanic eruptions, the 
European governmental regulators shut down flights in many areas where the airlines were 
sure that they could safely fly. As a result, the airlines were out a lot of money due to the 
overzealousness of the governmental regulators. 
When a disaster like this happens, not only do airlines cease to generate revenue, they “go 
backwards” financially by having to pay out all manner of funds for passenger hotel rooms, 
meals, re-routing, etc., none of which were caused by anything the airlines did or did not do. 
It goes without saying that some Shutdown would be required due to the problems created by 
the ash clouds. The issue that the airlines dispute is the length of time that the Shutdown was 
in place, and the expansive geographical area the Shutdown covered. Accordingly, the 
proximate causal event will have to be precisely defined as to the time and areas covered. The 
Economic Damages are the profits lost by not being able to fly in certain areas during certain 
periods when the airlines were comfortable flying but the governmental regulators prohibited 
them from flying. 
Once you have established the most likely future income projections before and after the 
proximate causal event, the difference in these two projections is the gross amount of the loss 
for the projection period, not taking time into consideration. That is your base number that 
you carry forward into the next step [39]. 
When an encounter happens, a lot of aircraft systems must be replaced or repaired, of course; 
for example, BA9 flight 
and KLM 867 flight 
were repaired and a lot 
of millions of dollars were 
spent. If an airplane encounters an ash or dust cloud and crashes, airline will lose the aircraft, 
insurance company will pay passengers’family but, above all, a lot of people will die. 
NASA’s Applied Sciences Program conducted an evaluation of the impact of the use of NASA 
Earth observations by the VAAC program. Although the program has been in existence for 
Figure 2.1 - Estimated repair costs to two types of McDonnell Douglas engine 
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many years, its impact became most apparent during a major volcanic eruption of 2010. The 
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland provided a test case of the benefits of the program. To 
estimate benefits, the analytic team obtained data on flight cancellations and revenue losses 
due to the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, as well as a range of estimates for the cost of repairing 
or replacing aircraft systems damaged by interactions with volcanic ash. The team interviewed 
project and NASA program staff to understand the decision processes that the observations 
supported, and then used a Bayesian-inspired approach based on historical data to develop an 
estimate of how much the NASA Earth observations would reduce the uncertainty about the 
level of ash threat. The team applied this risk reduction to the estimates of potential costs to 
estimate the risk-adjusted value of the observations. These risk-adjusted results were then 
extrapolated to the world as a whole to develop an overall estimate of the potential impact of 
the use of NASA Earth observations in the VAAC program. Potential Revenue Loss Impact 
from Flight Cancellations As previously stated, the cancellation of flights due to the Iceland 
volcanic eruption caused major revenue losses for airlines. 
The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull began on 12 April 2010. However, it was not until 15 April 
that airspace began to close. Eruptions continued until 23 April, but after 19 April the London 
VAAC’s data and models showed that flights could safely resume operations in some areas. 
On that same day, the London VAAC used NASA observations for the first time to refine and 
validate the findings and predictions of their existing systems and models. As a result of the 
findings at the London VAAC, in the afternoon of 19 April, German carriers Lufthansa and 
Air Berlin obtained permission for some flights from and to German airports under Visual 
(non-instrument) Flight Rules. Lufthansa was permitted to send planes to long-haul 
destinations to return stranded passengers later that day. 
Late on 19 April and early on 20 April, some flights were permitted to take off in northern 
Europe, including flights from Scotland and northern England, but Manchester Airport, which 
had planned to open on 20 April, remained closed because of a new ash cloud. The UK Civil 
Aviation Authority announced that all UK airports would be permitted to open at 10 PM on 
20 April. Twenty-six British Airways long-haul flights were already in the air and requesting 
permission to land. By 20–21 April several airlines confirmed that air service would resume in 
stages and started publishing lists of selected flights, with most airlines resuming service shortly 
after.9 Based upon this chronology, it is not possible to definitively identify the counter-factual 
case of what would have happened in the absence of the NASA observations. Presumably, 
flight operations would not have resumed as rapidly, as the level of uncertainty about safe 
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flight regions would have remained above the acceptable threshold of the policy makers. 
Decisions would have been made based on existing data sources, such as:  
• On-site volcano monitoring and eruption reporting (including volcanological,  
seismological, and geological monitoring and analysis); 
• Remote monitoring (including ground station monitoring, Doppler radar, airborne  
monitoring, and other, non-NASA satellite monitoring);  
•   Modeling and forecasting the expected path of the cloud; and  
•   Directly observing and communicating the extent of the plumes.  
For the counterfactual case, the analytic team considered two sets of decisions by regulators: 
either to slow the reopening of flight routes to take into account the increased uncertainty 
about the danger, or to reopen routes at the same rate, assuming more risk of aircraft damage 
due to uncertainty about which routes were safe. Extrapolating the Eyjafjallajökull data to 
aviation worldwide, use of NASA Earth observations could provide an expected value of up to 
$10 million per year in avoided revenue losses [40]. 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) estimated that airlines lost $1.7B in 
revenues over one week, 15-21 April 2010. Figure 2 displays the reduction in flights per day 
(red line), and the resulting estimated revenue loss (blue line), for this period. The IATA data 
indicate that, on the day of greatest impact, approximately 80 percent of European flights were 
cancelled, 
resulting in 
approximat
ely $450 
million in 
lost 
revenue. 
The next 
day, 19 
April, was 
the day that 
the London 
VAAC began to use the NASA observations to verify and validate their ash modeling and 
predictions. On the 20th and 21st flight operations were gradually restored to normal. Based 
on this information, the analytic team assumed that the maximum potential revenue loss in the 
absence of the NASA observations was approximately $450 million per day; or, stated 
Figure 2.2 - Estimated revenue Loss and percentage of European flights cancelled 15-21 April 2010 
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differently, $450 million was the maximum possible revenue loss that could be avoided if 
decision makers had perfect information about the location of dangerous volcanic ash clouds 
in April 2010 [41]. Their decision cost $1.8 billion in lost revenues for the airlines and $5 
billion for the global economy [42]. 
 
2.2  Social life and volcanic ash or desert sand clouds 
 
Encounters between Volcanic Ash or Desert Sand Clouds and Airplanes are rare events in a 
specific region of airspace but they are not so rare during a time interval considering the whole 
world airspace. The increasing of flight number is linked to number of encounters between 
aircrafts 
and 
volcanic 
ash 
clouds, as 
shown in 
Figure 2.3 
[2]. 
Indeed, 
forecasts 
about 
future 
flights number show constant increasing, after low reduction caused by global financial crisis. 
Therefore, clouds in airspace represent a safety problem, which can be also neglected twenty 
years ago.  
The closure of a large part of European airspace caused a lot of social consequences, during the 
eruption of Icelandic volcano; a lot of passengers could not come back home and they had to 
remain in airport or hotel. Other particular and significant consequences are listed: 
 several national leaders, including Barack Obama, Stephen Harper, Angela Merkel, 
and Nicolas Sarkozy, cancelled their plans to attend to the funeral of President of 
Poland Lech Kaczyński and his wife, who were killed on 10 April 2010 in a plane crash 
[43];  
Figure 2.3 – Cumulative Events by year 
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 the Forecasting Economic Support Group of ICAO's Committee on Aviation 
Environment Protection postponed a planned summit in Bern as North American and 
Scandinavian members would be unable to attend. It caused a huge economic failure; 
 the repatriation of five German Bundeswehr soldiers wounded in action on 15 April 2010 
in Afghanistan had to be postponed due to the closing of the German airspace. The 
MEDEVAC plane carrying them from Termez Airbase was rerouted to Istanbul where 
they are to be treated pending further developments; 
 on 20 April 2010, it was reported that around 160 Irish troops, mainly 
from Dublin and Dundalk and from the Eastern Brigade and due to return home on a 
chartered plane from a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, were stranded in the Balkans 
due to the travel disruption. They remained at Camp Clarke outside Pristina [44] ; 
 the President of Portugal, Cavaco Silva had to extend his state visit to the Czech 
Republic. The President made his way from Prague to Barcelona by car and then took a 
Falcon of the Portuguese Air Force home to Lisbon; 
 the Boston marathon took place without many athletes who had been in the affected 
countries [45]; 
 the World Chess Championship was delayed by one day, because the defending World 
Chess Champion Viswanathan Anand was stranded in Frankfurt; 
 fans found travel to the matches extremely difficult with some teams posting significantly 
lower attendances during the travel disruption. 
A fun episode of that incredible catastrophic event regards the trouble of actor/comedian John 
Cleese, who spent 30,000 Norwegian kroner (roughly €3000) on a taxi journey from Oslo to 
Brussels, after his flight from Norway was cancelled [46]. 
 
2.3  Current flight procedures to avoid encounters 
 
 “Ash clouds are not an everyday issue and they do not provide frequent hazard.  But if 
encountered, volcanic ash can spoil your entire day.” (Engen, 1994) 
In 1995, first dangerous encounters between airplanes and ash-clouds and a lot of problems 
caused by some eruptions described previously inspired ICAO to increase flights safety; so, it 
established 9 Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC). VAACs were established in the 
following locations: 
 Anchorage, AK, USA;  
 Washington, DC, USA;  
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 Buenos Aires, Argentina;  
 Darwin, Australia;  
 London, UK;  
 Montreal, Canada;  
 Tokyo, Japan;  
 Toulouse, France;  
 Wellington, New 
Zealand.  
Each VAAC observes and reports on a particular region of the world, so each location has a 
geographic area of responsibility for which it reports all information regarding volcanic events. 
It provides an important link among volcano observatories, meteorological agencies, air traffic control 
centers, and operators. These centers are charged with gathering information on the presence 
and motion of volcanic clouds and assessing any hazards to aviation. 
One product of the VAACs is the Volcanic Ash Advisory Statement (VAAS). In addition to 
providing VAASs directly to the airlines, the VAACs also provide information to appropriate 
meteorological organizations that subsequently issue significant meteorological information 
(SIGMET) and other reports. The ICAO publication "International Airways Volcano Watch" 
(ICAO annex III) contains further information and contact names and numbers. Detailed 
information on the VAACs, including contacts for each of the nine centers, is available at [47] 
Operators rely on the VAACs for information, and many operators maintain direct contact 
with volcano observatories within their flight domains. For instance, the Alaska Volcano 
Observatory (AVO) in Anchorage, with links to Fairbanks, issues a weekly bulletin by e-mail 
and fax detailing the activity of key volcanoes in Alaska. During periods of volcanic unrest and 
eruption, bulletins are issued frequently as conditions change. Anyone can request to be placed 
on distribution for the bulletins. The AVO web site [48] also provides updated information. 
Finally, many operators maintain personal relationships with individuals in the volcano 
observatories that monitor volcanoes within a particular flight domain. For instance, Alaska 
Airlines maintains contact with key individuals at the AVO because a significant portion of 
Alaska's flight domain could be affected by Alaskan volcanoes. 
Therefore, aviation regulators around the world, such as the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and EUROCONTROL, rely on the data from the VAACs, including NASA 
observations, to map the location and height of ash plumes. Without the ash plume location 
information, aircraft must either risk traveling through volcanic ash clouds, or officials must 
cancel flights to avoid potentially fatal encounters with these ash clouds [50]. 
Figure 2.4 - Geographic area of responsibility of each VAAC 
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Aircraft in flight are warned of ongoing volcanic eruptions via SIGnificant METerological 
(SIGMET) messages from regional Meteorological Warning Offices (MWOs) established by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2000). The SIGMETs are based on 
Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAAs) issued by VAACs, which describe details of the volcanic 
eruption such as: volcano name, date, time, location, height and extent of the ash cloud, and 
speed and direction of movement of the ash cloud. Information in the VAAs is obtained from 
analysis of:  
1. satellite imagery;  
2. aircraft pilot reports;  
3. volcano observatory advisories;  
4. on rare occasions, ground-based radars;  
5. other surface observations.  
Thus, remote sensing data is but one part of the volcanic hazard observation system. It is well 
known that many of the smaller volcanic eruptions are completely undetected by multi-spectral 
satellite techniques, particularly in moist tropical or subtropical regions where there is 
extensive cloud cover [50]. 
On 2010, after eruption of icelandic volcano, ICAO decided to create an International 
Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) at work on a global safety risk management framework, so 
as to be better prepared for a similar event should it occur.  After first dangerous encounters, 
many years previously, ICAO started to write up a list of advices to help flight crews to avoid 
encounters with or to recognize as soon as possible the flight through an ash or dust cloud. 
ICAO continually updates these recommendations; suggestions to avoid encounters are: 
 Flight crews should stay upwind of volcanic ash and dust; 
 Flight crews should note that airborne weather radar is ineffective for distinguishing ash 
and small dust particles. 
If an airplane on flight encounters an ash cloud, ICAO believes that flight crew can recognize 
that event by: 
 Odor. When encountering a volcanic ash cloud, flight crews usually notice a smoky or 
acrid odor that can smell like electrical smoke, burned dust, or sulfur. 
 Haze. Most flight crews, as well as cabin crew or passengers, see a haze develop within 
the airplane. Dust can settle on surfaces. 
 Changing engine conditions. Surging, torching from the tailpipe, and flameouts can 
occur. Engine temperatures can change unexpectedly, and white glow can appear at the 
engine inlet. 
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 Airspeed. If volcanic ash fouls the pitot tube, the indicated airspeed can decrease or 
fluctuate erratically. 
 Pressurization. Cabin pressure can change, including possible loss of cabin 
pressurization. 
 Static discharges. A phenomenon similar to St. Elmo's fire or glow can occur. In these 
instances, blue-colored sparks can appear to flow up the outside of the windshield or a 
white glow can appear at the leading edges of the wings or at the front of the engine 
inlets. 
In these cases, ICAO suggests to: 
1. Reduce thrust to idle immediately. By reducing thrust, engines may suffer less buildup of 
molten debris on turbine blades and hot-section components. Idle thrust allows engines 
to continue producing electrical power, bleed air for pressurization, and hydraulic power 
for airplane control. 
2. Turn the autothrottles off. This prevents the engines from increasing thrust above idle. 
Ash debris in the engine can result in reduced surge margins, and limiting the number of 
thrust adjustments improves the chances of engine recovery. 
3. Exit the ash cloud as quickly as possible. A 180-degree turn out of the cloud using a 
descending turn is the quickest exit strategy. Many ash clouds extend for hundreds of 
miles, so assuming that the encounter will end shortly can be false. Climbing out of the 
ash cloud could result in increased engine debris buildup as the result of increased 
temperatures. The increased engine buildup can cause total thrust loss. 
4. Turn on engine and wing anti-ice devices and all air conditioning packs. These actions 
improve engine stall margins by increasing the flow of bleed air. 
5. If possible, start the auxiliary power unit (APU). The APU can power systems n the 
event of a multiple engine power loss. It can also be used to restart engines through the 
use of APU bleed air. 
6. Use oxygen, if volcanic dust fills the flight deck. Use flight deck oxygen at the 100 
percent setting. 
7. Turn on the continuous ignition. 
8. Monitor engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT). Because of potential engine debris 
buildup, the EGT can climb excessively. The flight crew should prevent EGT 
exceedances. Shut down the engine and restart if the EGT is approaching limits similar 
to a hung start. 
26 
 
9. Fly the airplane by monitoring airspeed and pitch attitude. If necessary, follow the 
procedure for flight with unreliable airspeed. 
It is possible to note the benefits that NASA credits with VAAC creation n the following 
NASA scheme [49]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.5 Potential Benefits of Volcanic Ash Advisories 
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CHAPTER 3 – Overview on international studies 
 
3.1  Scientific Approaches 
 
A very practical and important act of a public organization, almost to simplify 
communications with public officials, is the realization of a numerical volcano alert code 
which was introduced by Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) in 
May 1991. Aviation officials adopted the alert code and designated corresponding flight 
restrictions and contingency routings for air traffic under each alert level. Under the original 
code, the appearance at the surface of new lava indicated an eruption was in progress and 
required that the original Alert Level 5 be maintained, even though little or no ash might be 
produced. Revision of the code became necessary after July 1992, when seismicity and 
nonexplosive growth of a lava dome required that PHIVOLCS maintain the highest alert at 
Alert Level 5 even though the eruption produced little or no ash. With the revised code, 
adopted on November 27, 1992, Alert Level 5 specifies a hazardous explosive eruption in 
progress with pyroclastic flows and (or) eruption column rising at least 6 km or 20,000 ft above 
sea level.  
Satellite-based remote sensing methods provided information for the detection and tracking of 
the Pinatubo ash clouds. To be of maximum benefit to aviation, these data should be collected 
at a central station, quickly and succinctly interpreted, and widely broadcast and disseminated 
in a form that is understandable to users including airline dispatchers and pilots. Delays of 
minutes to hours reduce the value and utility of the information. It is important for countries 
with satellite capabilities to determine the extent and movement of ash clouds to pass on such 
information quickly to countries and agencies at risk from drifting ash clouds. Following the 
Pinatubo emergency, the World Meteorological Organization and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization have requested the assistance of the governments of Australia, Japan, 
and the United States to develop satellite techniques that would provide warning of ash cloud 
movement that threatens aviation safety in areas where satellite data are not available [16]. 
After a few years, VAAC were created but, after eruption of icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull, 
their work increased. The function of each of the nine centres under the International Airways 
Volcano Watch is to respond to reports of volcanic ash within their region and provide 
forecasts to the aviation community of ash cloud extent and movement. Observations may 
come from ground stations and Volcano observatories, aircraft in flight or orbiting satellites.  
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The London VAAC and the Met Office’s realized a very good model to forecast the transport 
and spread of volcanic ash; the algorithm is implemented and software is NAME (Numerical 
Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment). The development of NAME began 
following the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and since that time has been used to model a wide 
range of atmospheric dispersion events, including previous volcanic eruptions and the 
Buncefield oil depot explosion in 2005. In addition to its role as an emergency response 
guidance tool, the model is used for routine air quality forecasting and meteorological research 
activities. NAME provides a flexible modelling environment which is able to predict dispersion 
over distances ranging from a few kilometres to the whole globe and for time periods from 
minutes upwards. Using NAME it is possible to specify point or spatially extended sources at 
any location in the atmosphere or at the surface, together with relevant source parameters such 
as the mass emission rate and duration. NAME is a Lagrangian particle model that calculates 
the dispersion of pollutants by tracking model 'particles' through the simulated atmosphere. 
The process is initiated by the release of model particles into the atmosphere from a user 
defined source. Each model 'particle' can have its own characteristics. For example, particles 
can represent different compounds, gases or chemicals, and particles can have real particulate 
sizes. For particulate matter species such as volcanic ash, each model particle represents a 
certain mass of the actual species. Once emitted, particles move in a manner determined by the 
meteorology. NAME is an offline model so the meteorology is a key input to the model. 
The NAME VAAC outputs are based on 6 hour time averages (taken over the 6 hours 
preceding the forecast time) [51].  
In Italy, Mount Etna is a very dangerous source of volcanic ash, three airports are near this 
volcano and they are often closed. Therefore, the Italian Civil Protection Department, in 
conjunction with ENAC (the Civil Aviation Authority), ENAV (the Company for Air 
Navigation Services), the Italian Air Force and INGV (the National Institute for Geophysics 
and Volcanology) has drawn up procedures to provide daily forecast maps of areas potentially 
affected by ash dispersal and to enable air traffic controllers to be alerted immediately in the 
event of an eruption. The Department coordinates the following operations on a daily basis: 
• the Italian Air Force and ARPA SIM (Regional Agency for Prevention and the 
Environment – Hydro-meteorological Service) in Emilia Romagna communicate wind 
field forecasts for the next 48-hours to the INGV in Catania; 
• the INGV inserts the forecast data into mathematical simulation models that consider 
the characteristics of a typical column of ash from Etna: height, mass and volume 
erupted, temperature, granulometry, etc.;  
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the INGV sends the Department  the forecast maps and after comparison with air 
sectors and approval, these are put at the disposal of the relevant air traffic control 
boards [52] [53]. 
Another software developed to forecast volcanic ash cloud trajectories is FALL3D: it is a 3-D 
time-dependent Eulerian model which circumvents many of the simplifications behind 
thesimplified ADM. The model can be used to forecast both particle concentration in the 
atmosphere (i.e. ash cloud evolution) and particle loading at ground level [54]. 
Another project is developed with cooperation of Caribbean States: Strengthening Resilience in 
Volcanic Area (STREVA) is an innovative interdisciplinary project of the University of East 
Anglia (UK), that aims to work collaboratively across different disciplines to develop and 
apply a risk assessment framework to generate plans that will reduce the negative 
consequences of volcanic activity on people and assets. The STREVA project brings together 
diverse researchers from universities and research institutes from within the UK and from 
those areas affected directly by volcanic activity.  
The STREVA team has been collaborating with the Seismic Research Centre, University of the 
West Indies and Management Organization (NEMO) since 2014, to explore the awareness and 
importance of volcanic risk from the perspective of decision-makers, government officials, 
emergency responders, monitoring agencies and the general public of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
It is remarkable, the study “on an end-to-end SysteM for volcanic ASH plume monitoring and 
prediction” (SMASH) project, funded by the ESA, has the objective to develop and validate 
new algorithms that implement polar orbiting satellite remote sensing data for volcanic source 
term characterisation, and for the quantitative retrieval of volcanic ash and SO2 plumes 
(http://www.evoss.eu) [55]. This project is realized with collaboration of: Compagnia 
Generale per lo Spazio S.p.A (Italy); University of Oxford (United Kingdom); Institut de 
Physique du Globe de Paris – IPGP (France); German Aerospace Centre - DLR (Germany); 
Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland). 
Indeed, a very multi-purpose and complete software, available for all people, is HYSPLIT: this 
is a complete system for computing simple air parcel trajectories to complex dispersion and 
deposition simulations. The intial development was a result of a joint effort between NOAA 
and Australia's Bureau of Meteorology. Recent upgrades include enhancements provided by a 
number of different contributors. Some new features include improved advection algorithms, 
updated stability and dispersion equations, continued improvements to the graphical user 
interface, and the option to include modules for chemical transformations. Without the 
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additional dispersion modules, Hysplit computes the advection of a single pollutant particle, or 
simply its trajectory [56]. 
VAACs have the target, as just discussed, of forecasting development of ash clouds as best as 
they can but the previous summary makes clear that a lot of research centers or state 
organizations follow that approach, trying to minimize the delay between moment of first 
alarm and moment of available forecasting. So, real time information is considered the best 
condition by all people interested to the problem but none seems working to obtain it. Safety 
though is also linked to real time information. 
 
3.2  Industrial Approaches  
 
Famous airplanes manufacturers (BOEING, NICARNICA, AIRBUS, ELBIT Systems) are 
also studying to create a system able to increase vision capability of pilots so that they can 
reveal they are flying in a volcanic ash cloud or, if alerted early, they can avoid encounters. 
Boeing company licensed some new devices to detect the approach of an aircraft to a volcanic 
plume having an ash concentration which is dangerous to aircraft, including a volcanic plume 
that is embedded in clouds, or to a gas plume having a volcanic gas concentration which is 
dangerous (i.e., toxic) to humans. The detection system is installed onboard an aircraft. The 
onboard system comprises one or more electronic gas sensors that are exposed to incoming 
cockpit or cabin air. This exposes the sensors to roughly the same gas concentrations as are 
present in the outside air. Each sensor measures the concentration of a respective gas in the 
incoming air which is moderately abundant in nearly all volcanic plumes, such as H2, CO2, 
SO2 and H2S. The detection system measures the concentration of one or more volcanic gases 
in air circulating in a space inside an aircraft and then generates a perceptible alarm when one 
or more measured volcanic gas concentrations exceed a respective user-specified threshold or 
when a pattern of volcanic gas concentration is recognized with a user-specified confidence 
level. These systems are configured so that the alarm indicates the proximity of dangerous 
levels of either a volcanic gas or of volcanic ash [57]. 
BOEING company also considered an additional problem: in daytime clear weather, pilots 
can see and avoid the visually distinctive cloud from an erupting volcano. However, volcanic 
plumes are often encountered during nighttime and/or embedded within other clouds. Even 
after detection, the mechanism to issue a notice to airmen imposes a delay for processing and 
distribution, during which an unwarned aircraft may encounter the plume.  Satellite 
observations are not continuous and an eruption that occurs between satellite passes may go 
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undetected for 6 to 12 hours, which is more than enough time for aircraft to encounter the 
plume. Therefore, the company realized a new invention, which combines the use of high-
quality GPS receivers onboard aircraft to measure signal quality with a computerized 
navigation system to compute the relative positions of the aircraft and satellites. A computer 
then uses the phase shift information from the receivers to detect the presence of a volcanic 
plume between the aircraft and the satellites. If a volcanic plume is detected in an aircraft's 
path, a warning is issued to the aircrew. Otherwise, the phase shift measurements can be 
collected and used by the computer to build a three-dimensional model of the atmosphere that 
shows the extent and location of the volcanic plume [58]. 
BOEING company has a very significant experience in aeronautical world and it realized that 
it is difficult to optically distinguish volcanic ash from other solid particles, e.g., smoke or ice: 
the boundaries of water-droplet clouds are typically much sharper than the boundary of a 
diffuse days-old volcanic plume, so the transition from low scatter to high scatter is relatively 
quick for clouds but relatively slow for volcanic plumes. A new onboard processor is projected 
and it can be programmed to recognize that when the airplane is in the stratosphere, or well 
above the freezing level in the troposphere, there will be no water-vapor clouds. two or more 
light sources may be utilized concurrently in conjunction with respective cameras. In 
embodiments having two or more cameras, the electronic image data from each camera may 
be outputted to respective processors or a single processor. In accordance with one 
embodiment, an alert will be activated in response to the electronic image data from any 
camera being compatible with the presence of volcanic ash particles in the surrounding 
atmosphere [59]. 
AIRBUS company collaborates with NICARNICA and EASYJET companies and they are 
developing “Airborne Volcanic 
Object Identifier and Detector 
(AVOID)”, which is, at the 
same, an on board-devices 
system; it utilises infrared 
technology fitted to aircraft to 
supply images to pilots and an 
airline’s operations control 
centre. The images will enable 
pilots to see an ash cloud, up to 
100km ahead of the aircraft Figure 3.1 – Increasing of vision capcability by A.V.O.I.D. system 
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and at altitudes between 5,000ft and 50,000ft, as shown in Figure 3.1. The system, therefore,  
will allow them to make small adjustments to the plane’s flight path to avoid any ash cloud. 
The concept is very similar to weather radars which are standard on commercial airliners 
today [60]. 
This system is already in an experimental step; indeed, on october 2013, an A400M Airbus test 
plane dispersed one tonne of Icelandic ash into the atmosphere at between 9,000ft and 11,000ft 
thereby creating conditions consistent with the 2010 
eruption. A second Airbus test aircraft, an A340-300, 
with the AVOID technology fitted, flew towards the ash 
cloud identifying and measuring it from around 60km 
away.The experiment also used a small aircraft, a 
Diamond DA42 from Düsseldorf University of Applied 
Sciences, to fly into the ash cloud to take measurements 
which help to corroborate the measurements made by the 
AVOID system. 
On July 2014, Nicarnica company join forces with 
israelian company “ELBIT Systems factory” to improve 
the development of this system [61]. Indeed, it has to be 
installed on external surface of aircraft and, so, it damages 
its aerodinamic efficiency as shown in Figures 3.2 - 3.3. 
 
 
  
Figure 3. 2 – Lateral photo of 
A.V.O.I.D. 
Figure 3. 3 - Photo of A.V.O.I.D. 
33 
 
CHAPTER 4 - The Monitoring and Alerting System  
 
The main aim is to provide the competent civil and aviation authorities with real time 
information on the volcanic ash propagation. This allows to define no-flight levels, to re-route 
scheduled flights and to give warning massages to planes already on flight. 
Some advantageous conditions are due to the use of instruments and technological method 
already developed and available. None of new technological instruments have to been 
implemented.  
The following methods are fundaments to create an automatic platform, which can offer 
significant opportunities:  
i. to avoid the total closure of airspace on some large zones; 
ii. to give warning massages to air-traffic controllers and, so, to planes already on flight; 
iii. to help pilots when a volcanic ash or desert sand cloud occupies own routes.  
Integrating alarm signals with no-alarm sectors related to each plane flying in the same 
airspace region, air–traffic controllers can define some no-flight levels, if necessary: they will 
able to decide if airspace, in that zone, would have to be incompletely open; it is very difficult 
that an airspace region could be closed. 
 
4.1  First model 
 
At the beginning, the project intended to monitor airspace real time using a permanent system 
composed of high range sensors to be installed on the land. Some kinds of sensor were 
considered and, then L.I.D.A.R. or Ceilometers were chosen;  these sensors are used to 
monitor aerosol in atmosphere but a lot of scientists have tested them to monitor volcanic ash 
for many years and results are very good now [52][62]. L.I.D.A.R. and ceilometers devices can 
monitor a cylindrical volume, which has radius and height equal to their sensitivity; that radius 
is about 20kilometers 
for devices, which are 
used to find ash or 
dust particles in 
atmosphere. A scheme 
of sensor operation is 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
A network of 
Figure 4.1 –  Cylindrical volume monitored by a sensor sensitivity: upper view and 
frontal view 
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L.I.D.A.R. already exists in Europe but it is not able to monitor whole airspace [63] [64]. 
The region of the airspace, where monitoring is required, is called “Area of Interest”. The 
model is based on two basic assumptions: terrestrial zone related to “Area of Interest” is far 
from sources of volcanic ash or desert sand clouds and only a flight level is considered. So, it is 
a 2D model; the 3D model should be the future step. The principal actor of this model is the 
air-route: flight crews had to follow a specific route, before Single European Sky ATM 
Research (SESAR) development and before perfection and diffusion of G.P.S. technology. 
This region is divided in some zones of risk; risk “R” is defined as: 
  
 
 
 “P” represents probability that an encounter happens; it depends on: 
1. number of volcanoes; 
2. eruption frequencies  
in a large zone including “Area of Interest”. 
 “Vu” represents vulnerability, the capability of airplane to withstand encounters; it 
depends on: 
1. kind of eruption of volcanoes in “Area of Interest”; 
2. physical conditions of volcanic ash o dust cloud; 
3. weather conditions; 
4. air-routes on airspace of “Area of Interest”; 
5. flight frequency; 
6. wind speed; 
7. wind direction; 
 “Val” represents value of elements in danger; it depends on: 
1. flight frequency on each air-route; 
2. population density;  
3. average number of flight passenger in those air-routes; 
4. average dimension of crash area; 
5. estimated cost of each human life; 
6. average airplane cost;  
7. cost of airspace closure. 
R = P × Vu × Val 
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It is necessary to define the extension of the minimal zone of study and to calculate the value 
of risk “R” for each one of these: it will be possible 
to obtain a map of iso-risk zone.  
A qualitative example of three risk zones is shown 
in Figure 4.2: yellow and blue lines split green 
“Area of Interest” in three different sectors. Air-
routes coordinates are acquired by a software 
developed on purpose using Mathworks MATLAB: 
in this overture, each air-route is considered linear 
(it is well known that each curve can be considered 
as the union of linear parts). Software allows to 
choose a lot of parameters to display a virtual map 
of “Area of Interest” and relative air-routes in risk zones. These parameters are shown in a 
setup menu, as in 
Figure 4.3. It is 
possible to import 
coordinates and 
data of real cases 
or to generate 
random 
configurations: in 
this case, air-
routes are 
represented by 
connections of 
some airports, 
whose  number is 
chosen by user.  
An example of air-routes is represented by green lines in Figure 4.4. Following images of this 
paragraph will be relative to the same configuration.  
Figure 4.2 – “Area of Interest” and risk zones 
Figure 4.3 – Setup Menu 
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The value of risk 
parameter is useful to 
define a virtual “Alert 
Perimeter” in 
airspace.  
An aircraft has to be 
alerted early respect to 
visualization of ash or 
dust cloud, because it 
needs for a technical 
time to change its 
direction; this 
distance can be called 
“Dalert”. While aircraft covers “Dalert”, the 
cloud would cover another distance, 
“Dash”, following own direction; this 
distance is smaller than “Dalert”, because 
cloud speed, called “valert”, is related to 
wind speed at that flight level: speed of 
aircraft is bigger than wind speed, of 
course. So, if flight crew is alerted when the 
distance between air-route and cloud is 
“Dsafe”, larger than “Dalert”, aircraft will avoid the encounter. It is advantageous to build a 
virtual “Alert Perimeter”: software has to build parallel 
lines on the left and on the right of each air-route; it has 
to create a buffer around each air-route, then 
intersection of all buffers related to all air-routes will set 
up a whole buffer. An example of this buffer is 
represented by black dots in Figure 4.5.  
“Alert Perimeter” will be the perimeter of this buffer. 
An example of “Alert Perimeter” is represented by 
violet dots in Figure 4.6.  
Figure 4.4 – Graphic explanation of buffer implementation 
Figure 4.6 Buffer related to all air-routes 
Figure 4.5 – – Buffer and “Alert Perimeter” 
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Buffer dimension will be the product of local value of risk “R” and “Dash”; three different 
values of buffer are displayed in Figure 4.5, because the risk value is bigger in the triangle, 
lower in the lowest triangle and medium in the zone between yellow and blue lines. 
It is important underline that “Dash” depends on four 
time intervals, which are: 
1. time passed from first instrumental alert to 
visualization on air-traffic controllers displays; 
2. time spent by air-traffic controllers to decide the 
right change direction; 
3. time spent by air-traffic controllers to transmit 
that choose to flight crew; 
4. time spent by pilot to set up operation; 
5. technical time to conclude change direction. 
The “Alert Perimeter” has to be monitored by a sufficient number of sensors.  
Terrestrial region related to “Area of Interest” is not uniform, so 
installation cost of each sensor could be relative to different zones 
of region: in Figure 4.7, different colors represent different 
installation zones of cost of sensors of same kind; each of them is 
characterized by its performance and its regional cost [65].  
Software generates a regular mesh of sensors related to terrestrial 
region of “Area of Interest”: each sensor has own area of 
responsibility and it must monitor this area. An example of mesh of sensors is shown in Figure 
4.8: each red dot represents a sensor; they are 
also displayed in different regions of 
installation costs.  
Software allows to define overlapping 
between consecutive sensors, if “Percentage 
of consecutive circles common radius” is 
changed. Figure 4.9 shows that each point of 
“Area of Interest” is monitored by more than 
one sensor, as user required.  
The aim is to place the sensors optimizing an 
objective function which is a linear 
combination of cost and performance, 
Figure 4.7 – Regional costs 
Figure 4.8 – Mesh of sensors 
Figure 4.9 – Consecutive sensors overlapping 
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guaranteeing that all the planes on flight can receive the warning with a sufficient advance 
along their route. Figure 4.10 shows that a lot of 
sensors are not useful to monitor the simple 
considered configuration, so they can be deleted; 
in a real case, they could be not installed and a lot 
of money could be saved.  
Moreover, a higher reliability of the system should 
be guaranteed covering each point of a route with 
more than one sensor.  
The first step of automatic platform monitoring a 
flight level is, so, to locate sensors: this problem 
can be modeled as a set covering problem (SCP), where we want to determine the minimum 
number of sensors to be located, which allows us to cover all the points of the warning 
boundaries, using a covering optimization models [66]. The model of problem is shown in 
Figure 4.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 – “Alert Perimeter” and sensors 
Figure 4.11 – SCP Model 
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The proposed model has been optimally solved by the usage of FICO-Xpress optimization 
software and tested on two real test cases using the airspace of northern Italy as “Area of 
Interest”; it is shown in 
Figure 4.12. The 
terrestrial zone of this 
“Area of Interest” is 
divided in three iso-risk 
zones for example, they 
are not identified by 
using previous rules.  
The set covering model 
has been experienced on 
different test instances: 
air-routes density is 
similar to the real configuration. The test cases differ for: 
- number of routes ( number of warning boundary points) 
- number of possible LIDAR locations 
- distribution of the routes 
- width of the warning boundaries 
First test case is shown in Figure 4.13 and relative “Alert Perimeter” are violet dots in Figure 
4.14. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 – Northern Italy and examples of iso-risk zones 
Figure 4.14 – “Aler Perimeter” of first test case 
Figure 4.13 - Air-routes configuration of first test case 
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Software Xpress identified domain to monitor, which 
is shown in Figure 4.15, and generated the solution, 
which is shown in Figure 4.16: using that 
optimization model, it calculates the best points 
where sensors should have been located and it prints 
their coordinates. The regular mesh of sensors was 
composed by 2682 
entities; Xpress 
calculations 
determine that only 
298 sensors are 
necessary to 
monitor that 
configuration of 
air-routes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second test case is shown in Figure 4.17 and relative “Alert Perimeter” are violet dots in 
Figure 4.18. 
 
Figure 4.17 – Air-routes configuration of second test case 
Figure 4.18 – “Aler Perimeter” of second test case 
Figure 4.16 Sensors placed by FICO Xpress, in first test case, using covering optimization model  
Figure 4.15 – Domain identified by FICO Xpress 
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Software Xpress identified domain to monitor, which is shown in Figure 4.19, and generated 
the solution, which is shown in Figure 4.20: using 
that optimization model, it calculates the best 
points where sensors should have been located and 
it prints their coordinates. The regular mesh of 
sensors was composed by 2990 entities; Xpress 
calculations determine that only 330 sensors are 
necessary to monitor that configuration of air-
routes [67]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sale price and installation cost of each sensor are very high; Single European Sky ATM 
Research (SESAR) project aims to smarter aviation, so it wants to make air-routes more 
autonomous [68]. That independence is associated to GPS navigation and to absence of 
precise air-routes but exact terrestrial coordinates, where sensors have to be located, leave. 
Fundaments of automatic platform had to be changed, of course. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 19 - Domain identified by FICO 
Xpress 
Figure 4. 20 - Sensors placed by FICO Xpress, in second test case, using covering 
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4.2  Current studies and new model 
 
More instrumental results, originated from earlier devices, have been jointed to give the 
possibility to evaluate airspace conditions. The most important role in the new model is played 
by each flight: air-traffic controllers help pilots to avoid volcanic-ash or desert-sand clouds. 
Air-routes cannot be considered as fixed entities therefore another actor has to be monitored to 
avoid encounters.  
Scenery in exam is shown in Figure 4.21: in this example, there are 5 aircrafts, represented by 
black “+”, each of 
them with own 
instantaneous route, 
represented by violet 
line, and a volcanic 
ash or desert sand 
cloud, represented by 
yellow dots, with own 
movement direction, 
represented by blue 
line. Considering 
previous observations, 
the constant entities in 
this model are 
airplanes; they are to 
be monitored, as a random 
example shows in Figure 
4.22.  
“Alert Perimeter” becomes a 
specific characteristic of each 
airplane and depends on few 
flight conditions, of course: 
1. aircraft speed; 
2. cloud speed; 
Figure 4.21 – Aircrafts & Volcanic Ash or Desert Sand Cloud in airspace 
Figure 4.22 – Airplanes become entities to be monitored 
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3. movement direction of aircraft respect to cloud. 
It can depend on risk value discussed in previous chapter, because that interpretation can help 
to improve flights safety. In Figure 4.22, dimensions of each “Alert Perimeter” are chosen 
without any physical reflection; moreover, it has to be considered that each “Alert Perimeter” 
has a z-component. If the third dimension is evaluated, it is possible to remove the hypothesis 
of only a flight level in exam: this model is a 3D-model; then, “Alert Perimeter” is a shell, 
which encloses the aircraft, so it can also monitor particles, which can encounter aircraft from 
along z-direction: it is possible also to remove the hypothesis about sources of particles 
(volcanic ash or desert sand) far from “Area of Interest”. Following illustrative figures are  
realized using Mathworks MATLAB. In Figure 4.22, all aircrafts and cloud are at same flight 
level; in Figure 4.23, boundaries of “Alert 
Perimeters” are shown as black lines, 
aircrafts are represented as big red dot and 
cloud is represented as yellow dots. 
Dimensions of cloud and “Alert Perimeters” 
are not related to any calculation, in that 
figure. 
Shape of “Alert Perimeter” is to be changed: 
the position of cloud is unknown and each 
aircraft has not a favorite direction to 
encounter the cloud; it is clear that the 2D-
Figure 4..24– Cloud and boundaries of “Alert Perimeters” of aircrafts  
Figure 4.23 – Upper view of cloud, aircraft and its 
“Alert Perimeter” 
44 
 
shape of “Alert Perimeter” has to be a circle. A mock-up of new model is shown in Figure 
4.24: aircraft is represented by blue “+”, boundary of “Alert Perimeter” by red dots, cloud by 
white dots and “Area of Interest” by violet lines. The 3D-shape of “Alert Perimeter” cannot be 
a sphere, because the radius will be surely larger than maximum flight level for aircrafts: that 
would lose any importance or would give often false alarm, as configuration in Figure 4.25 
shows. Therefore, this circle will extend itself long z-direction and the 3D-shape of each “Alert 
Perimeter” will be the 
external surface of a 
cylinder, as shown in 
Figure 4.26: the cloud is 
far away from aircraft, 
so “Alert Perimeter” 
does not encounter any 
particle.  
It is remarkable that all 
particles of  (volcanic ash o desert sand) cloud are unknown, so the virtual shell, which is 
named “Alert Perimeter”, could reveal particles in all directions at any time. If the virtual 
cylinder is too big, some negative consequences could happen:  
 number of points to monitor increases too much and, so, lead times of satellites or sensors 
could be significant; 
Figure 4. 25 – 3D-example of cloud, aircraft and its “Alert Perimeter” 
Figure 4. 2627 – “Alert Perimeter” is a spherical surface 
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 probability that particles of cloud cross around the “Alert Perimeter” and this one does not 
reveal their presence. When an aircraft encounters a (volcanic ash or desert sand) cloud, an 
unknown quantity of particles flow in cylinder, which becomes contaminated; “Alert 
Perimeter” though reveals only particles on external surface of cylinder and nothing is 
known about quantity just crossed. 
Therefore, two important parameters are unknown: radius and height of virtual cylinder. It is 
basic to define those parameters, if automatic platform has to be realized.  
The worst flight direction is 
meeting at right angles the 
cloud and those parameters 
will be at first set in that 
configuration.  
Aircraft route and cloud 
direction are orthogonal in 
upper view quoted Figure 
4.27: they are represented 
by violet lines, cloud is 
represented by black lines, 
aircraft is represented by 
blue “+” and boundary of 
“Alert Perimeter” are represented by red line. Aircraft is going near cloud: when “Alert 
Perimeter” reveals some particles, it alerts air-traffic controllers and flight crew, so pilot will 
able to drift and to fly along a new air-route parallel to cloud direction. The “Alert Perimeter” 
depends on aircraft speed, of course; it depends also on delay between first alert signal and the 
conclusion of change direction of aircraft; this delay depends also on five intervals: 
1. time passed from first instrumental alert to visualization on air-traffic controllers 
displays; 
2. time spent by air-traffic controllers to decide the right change direction; 
3. time spent by air-traffic controllers to transmit that choose to flight crew; 
4. time spent by pilot to set up operation; 
5. technical time to conclude change direction. 
During the sum of previous list of times, the aircraft goes near the cloud, as shown in the 
sequence of Figures 4.28 – 4.31; the radius of “Alert Perimeter“ has to become over and over 
Figure 4.28 – “Alert Perimeter” reveals cloud 
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again shorter than previous instant, because the cylinder has constantly to reveal the position 
of the nearest particles of cloud.  
 
 
 
The radius of “Alert Perimeter” is, so, a deterministic measure, if described intervals are good 
estimated. For this reason, those intervals are variable, they are not fixed and they depends 
also on aleatory parameters, therefore the radius of “Alert Perimeter” cannot be the radius of 
surface, which alerts when a volcanic ash or desert sand cloud is revealed; then, it represents 
the minimum distance where aircraft can safely change direction and avoid encounter. In the 
last figures, a blue circumference is drawn: it is the upper view of “Critical Sphere“: aircraft 
engines are able to suck up to a given distance; the radius of “Critical Sphere” is exactly equal 
or few longer than this distance. Another radius has to be considered: a “Monitoring Cylinder” 
has to be virtually implemented and its radius has to be larger than radius of “Alert Perimeter”. 
External surface of this cylinder will try to find cloud around the aircraft. The configuration of 
Figure 4. 31 - Aircraft is going 
near cloud  
Figure 4.29 - “Alert Perimeter” 
reveals for first 
time particles of 
cloud 
Figure 4.32 - Aircraft changes 
direction  
Figure 4.30 - New air-route is 
parallel to cloud 
direction  
Figure 4.33 – 3D representation of all virtual sufaces of an aircraft: “Monitoring Cylinder”, “Alert Perimeter” and 
“Critical Sphere” 
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virtual surfaces necessary to improve flight safety against encounters with volcanic ash or 
desert sand clouds are shown, for example, in the following figures 4.33 – 4.35. “Monitoring 
cylinder” is represented by yellow lines; “Alert Perimeter” is represented red lines and “Critical 
Sphere” is represented by black ‘*’. The volcanic 
ash or desert sand cloud is represented by white 
dots.: 
in these images, height of two cylinder is equal to 
radius of “Critical Sphere”; this is only an 
illustrative assumption. Those distances and radius 
of “Monitoring Cylinder” have to be defined and 
they could also depend on regional costs discussed 
in previous paragraph [65]. In the next paragraph, 
studies to set that radius will be explained. 
 
4.3  Results on first critical parameter 
 
The first parameter, which was examined, is radius 
of “Monitoring Cylinder”. It depends on some 
aleatory factors, therefore a statistical approach was chosen to define it: a series of seven 
simulations based on Monte Carlo method was 
realized.  
Each simulation is composed of 2•105 iterations: during 
each iteration two aircrafts and a cloud are randomly 
placed in a region of airspace. Length of “Area of 
Interest” is equal to 15 kilometers, width of “Area of 
Interest” is equal to 15 kilometers and height of “Area of Interest” is equal to 12 kilometers, of 
course. Cloud is simulated by 1000 particles and those particles are randomly placed in a 
parallelepiped, which has length equal to 20 kilometers, width equal to 3 kilometers and height 
equal to 0.5 kilometers. The lowest vertex of this volume is placed following three simple rules: 
x-coordinate is fixed at 5 kilometers plus a random value equal to 25% of cloud length at the 
utmost for each iteration; y-coordinate is fixed at 5 kilometers plus a random value equal to 
25% of cloud width at the utmost for each iteration; z-coordinate is fixed at 9 kilometers plus a 
random value equal to 25% of cloud height at the utmost for each iteration. Aircrafts flight 
levels are random over 7 kilometers, other two coordinates are randomly chosen for each 
Figure 4. 35 – Upper view  
Figure 4.36 – Right side view 
Figure 4. 34 – Frontal view  
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iteration. Cloud position is quite fixed: x-coordinate can change its value for 25% of cloud 
length, y-coordinate can change its value for 25% of cloud width, z-coordinate can change its 
value for 25% of cloud height. Each iteration represents  a case study and it is independent 
from other iterations.  
The radius of each “Critical sphere” is equal to 0.5 kilometers; the value of radius of “Alert 
Perimeter” is fixed and it is equal to 10 kilometers; the value of radius of “Monitoring 
Cylinder” changes after each simulation or after each series of iterations. During the first 
simulation, the value of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” exceeds the value of radius of “Alert 
Perimeter” of 5%; during the second simulation, the value of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” 
exceeds the value of radius of “Alert Perimeter” of 10%; during the third simulation, the value 
of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” exceeds the value of radius of “Alert Perimeter” of 20%; 
during the fourth simulation, the value of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” exceeds the value of 
radius of “Alert Perimeter” of 30%; during the fifth simulation, the value of radius of 
“Monitoring Cylinder” exceeds the value of radius of “Alert Perimeter” of 40%; during the 
sixth simulation, the value of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” exceeds the value of radius of 
“Alert Perimeter” of 50%; during the seventh simulation, the value of radius of “Monitoring 
Cylinder” exceeds the value of radius of “Alert Perimeter” of 60%.  
Sequence of configurations used during first simulation is the same in all other six simulations: 
homologous iterations are the same iterations cross over seven simulations. 
Particles revealed by “Alert Perimeter” and “Monitoring Cylinder” together are deleted by list 
of “Monitoring Cylinder”; particles revealed by “Alert Perimeter” and “Critical Sphere” 
together are deleted by list of “Alert Perimeter”. Therefore results are really independent. 
An example of the configuration used in each iteration is shown in Figure 4.36. 
Figure 4.37 – Example of configuration of each iteration 
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Number of particles revealed by “Monitoring Cylinder”, “Alert Perimeter” and “Critical 
Sphere” of all two aircrafts together after first simulation is shown in Figure 4.37 - 4.39. 
 
 
Graphics related to “Alert Perimeter” and “Critical Sphere” are not different after each of 
seven simulations, of course. It was difficult to evaluate graphics of results related to 
“Monitoring Cylinder”, so it was realized a distribution in frequency classes of number of 
particles revealed by “Monitoring Cylinder”: each class is composed of ten numbers and the 
Figure 4.387 – Particles revealed by “Monitoring Cylinder” in each iteration of first simulation 
Figure 4.39 - Particles revealed by  “Critical Sphere”in each iteration of first simulation 
Figure 4.3839 - Particles revealed by “Alert Perimeter” in each iteration of first 
simulation 
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division is regular, so the first class is 1-10, the second is 11-20 and so on to the last, 991-1000; 
100 frequency classes are realized. Number of iterations, which revealed a value of each 
frequency class, is saved; an only graphic was realized, frequency classes are reported on x-axis 
and numbers of iterations are reported on y-axis. Different lines represent: 
 black line is related to first simulation; 
 green line is related to second simulation; 
 blue line is related to third simulation; 
 magenta line is related to fourth simulation; 
 yellow line is related to fifth simulation; 
 cyan line is related to sixth simulation; 
 red line is related to seventh simulation; 
That graphic is shown in Figure 4.40 and it is zoomed in Figure 4.41. 
It is clear that, if radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” increases, the twentieth class represents the 
safe limit: that frequency class has maximum limit equal to 200 particles; each particle has a 
mean free path equal to 24.7 centimeters…very large ! 
It is remarkable that fifth class can represent an intermediate level of safety: the sixth 
simulation allowed to reveal about the same number of particles during much more iterations 
than the seventh; the safe limit is quite the same but,  during a very larger number of iterations 
Figure 4.40 – Iterations & frequency classes of 
particles 
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than seventh simulation, low numbers of particles were revealed: safety increases during these 
more probable events. Therefore, the value of radius of “Monitoring Cylinder” related to sixth 
simulation is the best, after this first step of studies. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.41 – Zoom in of graphic related to Iterations & frequency classes of particles 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Automatic platform is founded on a web-based software, which is able to integrate satellites 
terrestrial sensors data; therefore, it can alert air-traffic controllers and flight crews at first, then 
it will help to forecast trajectories of monitored plumes of volcanic ash or desert sand. 
Defining values of parameters discussed in the previous chapter represents the final step of 
preliminary studies; principal causes and consequences of problem about encounters between 
volcanic ash or desert sand and aircrafts are explained in the first part of dissertation; it was 
explained that encounters represent a very dangerous issue for people all over the world. That 
question already proved, above all in 2010, that it could cause very significant social and 
financial failures; it was neglected by organizations in charge until Icelandic eruptions on 2010. 
Current studies of scientists and aeronautical industries do not aim a global automatic system 
able to alert air-traffic controllers and flight crews in time to avoid encounters; at the present 
moment, researchers or pilots, who sight plumes, cry havoc and airspace is closed; that pilot 
and his passengers were in danger and others aircrafts are in danger, until aeronautical 
authorities close airspace: a lot of hours pass, with current rules…and that is not enough ! 
The statistical approach described in the last paragraph helps to define a risk value related to 
the amplitude of monitoring cylinder; other tests are useful and necessary to determine its limit 
dependent also on aircraft and cloud speeds. 
It is important that each aircraft has a virtual shell possibly able to monitor a surface also larger 
than the optimal one: safety must be priority !  
The statistical approach can also help to set this safety level. 
Further studies are required to: 
 prove that values of radius will be also safe, when relative directions of movement are 
not orthogonal; 
 define best height of virtual monitoring cylinder and alerting cylinder; 
 to develop a beta-version of desired software; then, this prototype will be used to do 
some tests using plane models and different sensors.  
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PARTICIPATIONS TO STARTUP COMPETITIONS  
 
The projects described in previous chapters were admitted to some italian competitions for 
interesting technological purposes; promoters of each competition wants to help young 
inventors to develop own ideas and to obtain an innovative commercial product. 
During 2014, those projects were admitted to: 
 “Creative Clusters AEROSPACE”, which was organized by “Regione Campania” 
through “Campania Innovazione” society; project was named “Ash and Sand Hazard 
Route Airspace Monitoring (ASHRAM)” and was tutored by 2 technical partners of 
“Campania Innovazione”: “Centro Italiano di Ricerche Aerospaziali” and “Distretto 
Aerospaziale Campano”. They have followed the team, who created the project, for 3 
months, helping inventors on innovation and business progression through coaching, 
mentoring and networking. C.I.R.A. was the technical tutor of project and wanted 
“ASHRAM” team to meet 3 international partners during “Borsa dell’Innovazione e 
dell’Alta Tecnologia”, on 10-12 December at Naples. 
 “Start Cup Campania”, which is a regional competition between all university of 
Campania. Project was named “No Ash and Sand in AirSpace (NASAS)”. The aim of 
competition is the realization of business plan. An independent committee defines the 
ten most significant ideas and, then, chooses first five ideas; these winners receive a 
little award and are able to compete against winners of same competition organized in 
all other italian regions. 
 
During 2015, the last version of project is competing to: 
 “UniCredit StartLab”, which is a Startup Accelerator for the best business project, 
promoted by UniCredit Group. The projects are judged by an expert team above all 
about its innovative contents; selected projects will be tutored for 12 months: expert 
consultant, business men and investors, who work together UniCredit team, will help 
authors to develop their project. UniCredit will ensure bank support and money awards 
for best projects. 
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ITALIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
PER QUANTO PUOI 
 
E se non puoi la vita che desideri 
cerca almeno questo 
per quanto sta in te: non sciuparla 
nel troppo commercio con la gente 
con troppe parole in un viavai frenetico. 
Non sciuparla portandola in giro 
in balìa del quotidiano 
gioco balordo degli incontri 
e degli inviti, 
fino a farne una stucchevole estranea. 
 
 
Scritta da    CONSTANTINOS  KAVAFIS 
 
Traduzione di: 
                                               Margherita Dalmati                                                                          
&  Nelo Risi 
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La mia vita è divenuta, oltre un decennio fa, sicuramente, poco invidiabile, perché intrisa di 
sofferenza, sacrifici e privazioni, ma il “leit-motiv” della poesia del Kavafis mi ha spinto 
continuamente a valorizzarla, senza farne una monocorde nota lamentosa; così, nonostante le 
difficoltà aggiuntive provocate dall’“etica” vigente in Occidente, ho tentato di concludere nel 
migliore dei modi anche questo cammino divenuto tanto arduo, a causa di alcune scelte poco 
opportune e di  un’organizzazione troppo burocratizzata. 
Ringrazio chi ha creduto in me, come i miei genitori, sempre convinti che potessi giungere al 
risultato sperato. Ringrazio il prof. Moccia, che, all’inizio del percorso, aveva percepito la 
pericolosità delle scelte iniziali, avvisandomi e invitandomi caldamente a palesare eventuali 
dubbi futuri, rimasti taciuti soprattutto per timidezza e timore infondato. 
Ringrazio la prof.ssa De Angelis, spesso intervenuta a sminuire difficoltà apparentemente 
insormonatbili, il prof. Palumbo, che, nonostante le proprie spiacevoli vicissitudini, ha voluto 
rassicurarmi e aiutarmi, contribuendo in un settore non di propria specifica competenza, ed il 
prof. Bozza, persona di grande umanità. 
Ringrazio i proff. De Luca e Meola, sia per l’aiuto nel terminare il lavoro di tesi sia per il 
sostegno morale a non demordere, persino in questa situazione sempre più simile a quella 
raccontata nel film“The Terminal”.  
Ringrazio Marinella, Clorinda ed il mio nipotino, Lucio Gabriele, capace di rallegrare 
anche i momenti più bui. 
Ringrazio Anna, che, apparsa nelle fasi finali del percorso, è sempre pronta ad incoraggiarmi. 
Il pensiero conclusivo di tanto impegno deve essere il passo più elevato, che premi chi ha scelto 
di dare considerazione ad ogni parte; ecco, quindi, la dedica ed il ringraziamento ad una persona 
speciale, Graziella, che, nell’ultimo tratto di questo arduo percorso, pur lasciandomi solo, è 
andata ad intercedere, sicuramente anche per me, da vicino, l’Amatissimo Volto Santo! 
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«Cominciate col fare ciò che è necessario, 
poi ciò che è possibile.  
E all'improvviso vi sorprenderete  
a fare l'impossibile».  
(San Francesco d’Assisi) 
 
